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ABSTRACT
Federal wildland fire policy and program reviews following the 1994 and 2000 fire
seasons required recognizing fire as a natural process and reducing hazardous fiiel
accumulations. To meet this requirement, new policy encouraged managing natural
ignitions to meet resource benefits (called Wildland Fire Use, WFU). However,
mechanical treatments and prescribed burning comprise the majority of fuel reduction
treatments effected to date. Budget constraints and the need for repeated treatments
suggest that successful fuel and ecosystem management hinges on expanding the WFU
program.
The decision to authorize WFU in the U.S. Forest Service ultimately rests with the line
officers, typically the district rangers. The so-called 'go/no go' decision constitutes a
time-critical risk assessment. The factors weighing in to this risk assessment underpin
the feasibility of expanding the WFU program.
This study aimed to determine the influences on the line officers' go/no go decision.
This study conducted a telephone survey of all the U.S. Forest Service district rangers
with the authority to use WFU in the Northern, Intermountain, and Southwestern
Regions. The census was completed during February of 2005 and obtained an 85 percent
response rate.
This study used classification and regression tree (CART) analysis to examine the data
collected. Personal commitment to the WFU program provided the primary classifier for
91 percent of the district rangers who authorized WFU. External factors, negative public
perception, resource availability, and a perceived lack of support from the agency
surfaced as the main disincentives to authorizing WFU
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1. INTRODUCTION
Effective fire suppression over the last 100 years has led to changes in forest structure.
The fuel buildup resulting from fire exclusion has left millions of acres prone to higher
severity wildland fires than those that historically visited the landscape. Active fire
seasons in 1994 and 2000 drew attention to this unanticipated consequence of fire
suppression and instigated a shift in national fire policy towards hazardous ftiel reduction.
In an attempt to provide performance measures and reduce the immediate likelihood of
'catastrophic' wildfire, agency direction has focused on mechanical treatments and
prescribed burning. While these treatments do alter the forest structure responsible for
the higher intensity fire events, they do not remedy the underlying problem of fire
exclusion.

Wildland Fire Use (WFU) is the fire management strategy that allows natural ignitions to
bum in predetermined locations under scripted conditions. This strategy allows fire to
assume its role as a vital ecosystem process. Originally conceived to allow natural
processes to dominate in designated Wilderness areas, WFU has predominantly been cast
as a wilderness management tool. However, changes to national fire policy since 1995
have encouraged the recognition of fire as a natural process. This new direction, in
conjunction with the ability of WFU to restore both structure and process, suggests that
WFU should assume a more prominent role as a fuel management tool. Although WFU
is not a viable option on all lands, expanding its use would help avoid a hopeless
exercise: running after symptoms rather than addressing the root problem.
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The decision to authorize WFU rests with agency administrators. The need for
managerial accountability has created a decision process that places all of the authority
(and consequent liability) on the administrator. Specifically in the US Forest Service
(USPS), District Rangers are the line officers most fi-equently presented with the 'go/no
go' decision on whether to allow WFU. The USPS has stated the intent of restoring fire
to the landscape. Consequently, understanding the drivers of the so-called 'go/no go'
decision assumes critical importance.
1.1. Background

1.1.1. Smokey's legacy
Federal fire policy began focusing on suppression shortly after the creation of the
National Park System in 1872 (Stephens and Ruth 2005). This paradigm grew to
encompass not only patrols in the newly created parks but also interpretation of the
Organic Administration Act of 1897 that created the Forest Service (Nelson 1979). Large
fires across the inland Northwest only a few years later, in 1910, further justified wildfire
suppression (Amo and Fiedler 2005). Perhaps one of the most effective public relations
figures ever created, Smokey Bear, objectified the need to eliminate fire to the American
public. This bear, armed with a shovel, a plea ("Only you can prevent forest fires"), and
an imploring stare, successfully placed forestland preservation into firefighters' hands.

The resulting fire suppression organization was perhaps too effective. Rumblings of fire
exclusion's negative effects followed on the tails of the policy's adoption (Koch 1935,
2

Weaver 1943). Starting in 1963, detrimental loss of the early serai species maintained by
fire was tied to fire suppression (Leopold et al. 1963). Shortly thereafter, passage of the
Wilderness Act (1964) codified the need to preserve natural processes in the designated
Wilderness areas. This nod to natural processes opened the door for the prescribed
natural fire (PNF) program, through which lightning strikes could bum under certain
conditions to achieve resource benefits.

Despite inklings that fires belonged on the landscape, suppression expenditures jumped
starting in the 1970s (Nelson 1979). The 1988 fire season drew national attention to the
developing tinderbox, as fires burned through Yellowstone National Park and the
Scapegoat Wilderness in northern Montana. Policy and program review following these
large fires put a moratorium on the prescribed natural fire program. These fires also
initiated a trend towards more, harder to control wildfires, with successively more
dramatic fire seasons in 1994, 2000, 2001, and 2002 (Stephens and Ruth 2005).
1.1.2. Policy solutions to fire exclusion
Federal fire policy reviews initiated after the 1994 and 2000 fire seasons addressed the
need to restore fire to the landscape and, more specifically, to mitigate hazardous fuel
accumulations in fire-adapted ecosystems. Although the text of these policies
acknowledges fire as an essential component of many ecosystems, implementation has
focused on remedying the fuel accumulations resulting from suppression.

3

The 1995 Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy and Program Review followed an
active fire season that left 34 fatalities in its wake. For the first time, the guiding
principles established by the review determined that the planning process would
incorporate "the role of wildland fire as an essential ecological process and natural
change agent" (NWCG 1995a). Specific policies developed from these guiding
principles further stated:
fire as a critical natural process will be integrated into land and resource
management plans and activities on a landscape scale;
-

wildland fire will be used to protect, maintain, and enhance resources and as
nearly as possible, be allowed to function in its natural ecological role.

Although this language appears to encourage managing wildland fire for resource
benefits, this policy has translated into a goal of reducing fire hazard by using mechanical
treatments and prescribed burning (NWCG 1995a).

Direction from the 1995 policy review increased the number of acres treated to reduce
fuels from fewer than 500,000 in 1994 to over 2.4 million in 2000 for both the
Department of Interior Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Forest Service
(USDA-USDI 2000). Despite this increase in fuel treatments, the 2000 fire season had an
inauspicious start. The Cerro Grande prescribed fire escaped, and burned 235 homes and
48,000 acres. The remainder of the fire season followed this lead, with twice the 10-year
average acreage burning between May and September (USDA-USDI 2000). Another
federal wildland fire policy review ensued.

4

The 2000 review of 1995 federal fire policy reaffirmed the need to incorporate fire as a
critical ecosystem component in the planning process (NWCG 2001), and
implementation of this goal again has centered on fuel reduction. "Managing the impacts
of wildfires on communities and the environment: a report to the President in response to
the fires of 2000," prepared by the Departments of Agriculture and Interior,
recommended increasing funding for hazardous fuel reduction. This report also
identified the most significant challenge to implementation as the substantial increase in
the acreage of forest lands to receive treatment (USDA-USDI2000). This report's
recommendations, in conjunction with congressional funding, formed the National Fire
Plan that currently provides implementation guidance for federal fire policy (NWCG
2001).
1.1.3. Agency performance rating tied to hazardous fuel reduction
Implementation of the 1995 and 2001 policy revisions has focused restoration efforts on
the ecosystem types most adversely affected by fire exclusion. Fire suppression has led
to the greatest forest structural changes in low-elevation, dry ecosystems maintained by
fire regimes I and II (Mutch 1994)'. These areas, which have skipped one to two fire
events in the past 80 years, now exhibit greater stand densities, fewer serai species, and
higher crown-fire potential (e.g. Mutch 1994, Mutch and Cook 1996, NWCG 1998).
This apparent forest health problem is juxtaposed to increasing housing development in

' Fire regimes describe the role fire plays in an ecosystem and are characterized by time between fire
events (frequency) and effect on overstory vegetation (severity) (Agee 1993). Five fire regimes distinguish
between low-severity and stand-replacement severity bums that occurred every O-to-35 years (fire regimes
I and II), mixed-severity and stand-replacement severity bums every 35-to-lOO years (fire regimes III and
IV), and stand-replacement severity bums that occurred less than once every 200 years (fire regime V,
Schmidt et al. 2002).
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forest areas. The Wildland Urban Interface (WUI), defined as areas where houses either
intermingle with or sit adjacent to contiguous vegetation, grew by 30 percent between
1990 and 2000 in the intermountain West alone (Stewart et al. 2005).

Federal fire policy has focused on mitigating the effects of decades of fire suppression;
implementation has followed suit. For example, the National Fire Plan comprises one of
the five key performance areas for the Forest Service in complying with the Budget and
Performance Initiative of the President's Management Agenda (USDA 2004a). Acres of
hazardous fiiels in condition classes 2 or 3^ in fire regimes I, II, or III, and acres of forest
health protected are two of the performance indicators used. Similarly, the Forest
Service's strategic plan for fiscal years 2004-2008 identifies the first goal for these four
years as "reducing the risk fi-om catastrophic wildfires" by improving the health of the
Nation's forests and grasslands (USDA 2004b). Performance measures identified to
achieve this goal include increasing the number of acres treated to reduce hazardous
fiiels, and increasing the number of acres treated per million dollars gross investment
(USDA 2004b). Attainment of performance targets must result fi-om management actions
tied to budget line items. Mechanical treatments and prescribed bums constitute
budgetable activities and performance therefore rests on acres treated using these two
methods.

^ Fire Regime Condition Class indicates the degree of departure from the historical fire regime. Condition
classes 2 and 3 refer to areas that have missed more than one fire event (Schmidt et al 2002). Condition
class indicates the extent to which fire exclusion has altered key ecosystem components: vegetation
structure, species composition, and potential fire behavior characteristics (Hann and Bunnell 2001).
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Not only have performance measures been linked to hazardous fuel reductions, but
budgets have been too. The Healthy Forests Initiative authorized in 2002 and the Healthy
Forests Restoration Act of 2003 put location restrictions on the projects they fund. Fifty
percent of the funding for projects conducted under their auspices must go to fuel
reduction in the wildland-urban interface. Fiscal year 2005 program direction for the
USFS specifies that managers should maximize opportunities to implement projects that
will reduce hazardous fuels.

Despite this effort to address fuel accumulation, three problems arise. First, fuels still
accumulate at two to three times the current treatment rate (USDA 2004a). Second, the
most accessible, and therefore least expensive, treatments may have been done (Calkin,
personal communication 2005, GAO 2005). In the current climate of budget rescissions,
it is unlikely that all the acres that need treatment to remedy 100 years of fuel buildup
will receive it. Third, since these treatments focus mostly on the O-to-35 year return
interval fire regimes, one-time treatments will not resolve the problem of fuel
accumulation. These areas will need maintenance treatments on regular intervals to truly
resolve the forest structure problems resulting from fire exclusion (Black 2004). This
scenario seems unlikely given the difficulty of treating the initial acreage even once.
1.1-4. Wildland Fire Use as a means to restore process
Minimizing future damage to communities and key ecosystem components relies on
reducing hazardous fuel accumulation (e.g., Miller 2003). However, this fuel buildup
stems fi-om years of fire suppression. While focusing on fuel reduction provides concrete
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objectives and performance measures, it does not address the root problem. Increasing
the acreage with fire allowed to play its historical role, in conjunction with treating the
symptoms of fire exclusion, will begin to resolve the broader fuel management problem.

Prescribed natural fire (PNF) is the fire management strategy that allows natural ignitions
to bum under predetermined conditions. This management option grew out of the
Wildemess Act of 1964 that mandated natural processes to dominate within Wildemess
areas (Mutch 1995). The National Park Service allowed the first PNF to bum in SequoiaKings Canyon National Park in 1968 (Stephens and Ruth 2005) and USFS policy
changed in 1971 to allow PNF in designated Wildemess areas (Benedict et al. 1991).
This new option of wildemess fire broke the grip that suppression had on fire
management and yet the wildemess ideology drove the use of PNF more than a desire to
treat fuels (Pyne 1995).

Prescribed natural fire was re-baptized as Wildland Fire Use (WFU) in the 1995 Federal
Wildland Fire Management Policy and Program Review (NWCG 1995a). Following this
policy review, managing natural ignitions for resource benefits has largely remained a
wildemess management tool (Kilgore and Nichols 1995). With National Forests
expanding the acres approved for WFU outside of Wildemess boundaries (see Results
section of this paper), it seems that WFU can assume a more prominent role in fuel
management. As a tool that restores process and in so doing begins to remedy structure,
WFU can help address the fundamental cause of the current fire management problem
(Miller 2003, Stephens and Ruth 2005).
8

1.1.5. The go/no go decision
The decision to allow WFU (called 'go/no go') can only come after meeting three
planning requirements (NWCG 1995a). The Land/Resource Management Plan (L/RMP)
provides general direction for the wildland fire management direction. In the USPS, the
L/RMP corresponds to the Forest Plans that must go through a public comment period
(36 CFR 219). Fire Management Plans (FMP) tier to this document. These plans
identify the fire management strategies available for every burnable acre. For areas
determined as eligible for wildland fire use by the FMP, managers must create guidelines
that specify the burning conditions acceptable for wildland fire use (NWCG 2003).

With these plarming requirements satisfied, managers can evaluate individual lightning
strikes for potential resource benefits. Initial assessment of individual fires follows the
process outlined by the Wildland Fire Implementation Plan Stage 1 (WFIPl). The
WFIPl process documents the elements considered in the go/no go decision and sets a
periodic needs assessment schedule. The Stage 1 framework can guide management of a
WFU event with low potential for spread and negative impacts (NWCG 2005).

If the periodic assessment indicates a changing fire situation, then plaiming will progress
to the Wildland Fire Implementation Plan Stage 2 (WFIP2). This stage provides a
planning structure for larger, more active fires with the potential for greater geographic
extent than Stage 1 WFU events (NWCG 2005).

9

A WFU fire that exceeds the planning capacity of the Stage 2 plan can transition to the
Wildland Fire Implementation Plan Stage 3 (WFIP3). This stage defines the
management actions required in response to increasing fire activity, a potential for longer
duration, or a need for increased management activity. The WFIP3 presents a detailed
planning effort that addresses management objectives and constraints in detail. Stage 3
also requires a quantitative risk assessment and cost estimates (NWCG 2005).

Federal policy designates the agency administrator as the final authority on the go/no go
decision (NWCG 2005). In the USFS, for example, line officers act as the agency
administrator (USDA-FS 2000) and assume both the authority and the legal and career
liabilities for the decision to allow WFU.

Increasing WFU utility as a fiiel management tool for the USFS hinges on line officers
authorizing its application. Understanding the decision process underpinning WFU will
provide critical insight into the feasibility of its use as a fiiel management tool in
Wilderness, and perhaps more importantly, outside of Wilderness.
1.1.6. Factors influencing the go/no go decision: policy direction
Federal wildland fire policy provides a formal fi-amework for the go/no go decision. The
Forest Service Manual stipulates that firefighter and public safety take precedence over
any other concern (5103.1), and that a WFU project may only be implemented with
trained and qualified personnel (5145.1).
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The current Wildland Fire Use Implementation Procedures Reference Guide (NWCG
2005) identifies additional elements that must enter the decision process. Only natural
ignitions may be managed for resource benefits, and each wildland fire may have only
one objective. If at any point a WFU fire ceases to meet the stated objectives, it must be
managed for suppression objectives. Similarly, if a WFU fire combines with a wildland
fire managed for suppression objectives, the suppression objective will override resource
objectives.
Decision criteria checklist
For wildland fires that meet the criteria above, the Wildland Fire Implementation Plan
Stage 1 process (WFIPl) provides an evaluation of the candidate fire's physical elements.
This evaluation establishes whether the fire lies within the prescriptions outlined in the
fire management plan and WFU guidebook. The WFIPl also includes a Decision
Criteria Checklist (NWCG 2005). A 'yes' answer to any criterion indicates a suppression
response. This checklist leads the agency administrator through a decision process that
includes five criteria:
1. threat to life, property, or public and firefighter safety that cannot be mitigated;
2. potential effects on cultural and natural resources outside the range of desired
effects;
3. relative risk indicators and/or risk assessment results unacceptable to the
appropriate agency administrator;
4. other proximate fire activity that limits or precludes successfiil management of the
fire;
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5- other agency administrator issues that preclude wildland fire use.

The relative risk assessment identified in number 3, above, involves a combination of risk
to values, fire hazard, and the probability of the fire becoming an active event. Risk to
values reflects a combination of natural and cultural concerns, location of the fire with
respect to values, and social and economic concerns. Fire hazard collapses fire regime
condition class, expected fire behavior, and potential fire size into one variable.
Probability indicates the combined effects of time of season, barriers to fire spread, and
seasonal severity (NWCG 2005).

Agency administrators have 8 hours from ignition detection and strategic size-up to
complete the qualitative risk assessment included in the WFIPl. Up until January of
2005, line officers faced a 2-hour time constraint on the go/no go decision (NWCG 1998,
2005).
1.1.7. Factors influencing the go/no go decision: informal studies
Federal fire policy and the Wildland Fire Use implementation guidelines provide
elements that agency administrators must consider in their go/no go decision. As
documented in the Decision Criteria Checklist, 'other issues' can enter into the decision.
Several authors peripherally address these issues, which fall into six broad categories:
attitude towards risk, potential impact to resources, public attitudes, staffing, cost, and
land stewardship.
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Personal risk posture and the risk of a WFU event escaping surfaced most frequently as
barriers to authorizing WFU (Amo and Brown 1991, Bradley 1995, Bunnell 1995, Calkin
et al. forthcoming, Daniels 1991, Kilgore 1991, van Wagtendonk 1995, Williams 1995).
This risk assumes greater importance when combined with potential damage to natural
resources, private property, or commodities such as timber (Czech 1996, Parsons and
Landres 1998). The potential professional consequences of a WFU fire escaping and
damaging these resources could also enter the decision process (Amo and Fiedler 2005,
Bunnell 1995, van Wagtendonk 1995).

Beyond career impacts, failure to exercise due care under the circumstances (negligence)
could indicate liability for ensuing damages (White 1991). In the case of employee
injury, decision-makers could be held liable without evidence of negligence (Stanton
1995).

The possibility of a WFU event damaging other resources and property adds to the career
risk inherent in the decision to authorize WFU.

Lack of public support (Czech 1996, Daniels 1991), coupled with the documented need
for public buy-in for successful fire and fiiels management (Shindler and Toman 2003,
Weible et al. 2005) could also factor into the agency administrator's decision. Air quality
concerns from both regulatory and public opinion perspectives could constitute "other
agency administrator issues" (Amo and Brown 1991, Czech 1996, Parsons and Landres
1998).
13

Daniels' (1991) analysis of his decision to authorize the Canyon Creek PNF in 1988, a
fire that subsequently exceeded its authorized perimeter and helped instigate the 1988
Federal Wildland Fire Policy and Program Review, revealed additional influences. The
managerial endurance required to commit to managing a WFU event for an extended and
indeterminate period enters into the go/no go decision (Bonney 1998, Daniels 1991,
Tomascak 1991). Part of the problem with committing to managing a WFU event for an
extended period relates to staffing. Both Benedict et al. (1991) and Daniels (1991)
indicate that having highly qualified personnel available in adequate numbers weighs
heavily in the decision to use WFU.

While these authors predominantly suggest factors that tip the decision towards "no go,"
others indicate influences in favor of authorizing WFU. Anecdotal evidence of cost
savings through wildland fire use suggests this as a possible motivator (Bonney 1998,
Calkin et al. forthcoming, Czech 1996, Daniels 1991). In addition to reducing costs, the
desire to minimize firefighter exposure to the dangers of wildland fires could also
influence the go/no go decision (Bonney 1998). Finally, a dedication to stewardship that
dictates a commitment to restoring fire could inspire a 'go' decision (Amo and Fiedler
2005, Jolly 1995, Pyne 1995).
1.2. Literature Review
Federal policy and agency directives establish several of the elements agency
administrators must consider in their go/no go decision. Beyond these sideboards,
14

published works by several authors address the potential factors affecting the decision to
use WFU.
1.2.1. Studies on decision elements
Four studies provide evidence for the factors influencing the decision to use WFU. One
of these studies assessed factors influencing fire managers' risk behavior (Cortner et al.
1990), two studies examined barriers to prescribed burning (Cleaves et al. 2000, NWCG
1995b), and another explored information needs for wildland fire and fuel management
(Miller and Landres 2004).

Cortner and others (1990) investigated influences on fire managers' risk behavior. This
research conducted a mail survey of 994 USPS fire managers in five western regions
(Northern, Southwestern, Intermountain, Pacific Southwest, and Pacific Northwest). The
scenarios included in the questionnaire looked to identify the fire managers' risk behavior
in the context of escaped wildfires, prescribed bums, and long term fire budget planning.
The 837 respondents indicated that safety considerations, resources at risk, and changes
in public opinion had the most effect on shifting decisions towards risk aversion. The
questions specifying safety considerations hypothesized changes in personnel availability
and personnel experience. Public opinion specifically related to trust in agency
professionalism had more effect on decisions than criticism by influential groups or
concerns over arousing public anger. Although this study investigated effects on fire
managers' risk-behavior in the contexts of escaped wildfire, prescribed burning, and long
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range fire planning, factors such as safety considerations, resources at risk, and concerns
for agency professionalism could also influence the WFU decision-making process.

An informal survey conducted in 1995 by the National Wildfire Coordinating Group's
Prescribed Fire and Fire Effects Working Team (now Fire Use Working Team) also
identified barriers to prescribed burning. The most frequently reported obstacles included
a shortage of qualified people, need for public education, limited burning windows, high
hazards in the Wildland Urban Interface, lack of fimding, extreme fire behavior, and
politics. These results could also apply to the go/no go decision on WFU.

Cleaves et al. (2000) conducted a mail survey of 114 USFS Fire Management Officers
(FMO) in seven USFS regions (all except Alaska). Their survey aimed to assess
influences on prescribed burning activity and costs, and as a result identified barriers to
prescribed burning. The 95 FMOs who responded indicated that smoke and air quality, a
lack of funding for prescribed burning, personnel shortages, narrow burning windows,
and liability inhibited prescribed burning activity. Although the Cleaves et al. (2000)
study did not specifically address WFU, the results support factors suggested anecdotally
and discussed previously.

Miller and Landres (2004) conducted the only study specifically examining influences on
WFU. Their research included both a mail survey and a workshop. The mail survey
targeted 300 fire and fuels managers with the USFS, the National Park Service, Bureau of
Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The
16

results of their questionnaire indicated that firefighter safety, potential impacts to private
property, developments and facilities, and threats to human life in the Wildland-Urban
Interface constituted the primary reasons to suppress candidate WFU events. Miller and
Landres' survey also revealed the primary reasons to allow WFU: to allow natural
processes, to improve wildlife habitat, to reduce fuel hazards, and to improve resource
conditions.

The workshop conducted as part of Miller and Landres (2004) study determined several
additional obstacles to managing wildland fires for resource benefits. The 14 workshop
attendees (fire managers and fire ecologists) indicated that multiple ignitions, a lack of
available resources, administrative boundaries, conflicts with other resource management
objectives, and potential impacts to the Wildland Urban Interface inhibited the decision
to allow WFU. Participants also suggested that the decision-maker's risk-posture could
constrain the decision to "go."
1.2.2. Impetus for this study

A review of the literature on the factors influencing an agency administrator's decision to
authorize wildland fire use indicates an information gap. Beyond items mandated by
policy to be included in the decision, several authors have addressed this question in
passing (e.g., Benedict et al. 1991, Czech 1996, Daniels 1991). The four formal studies
discussed previously have examined influences on prescribed burning, factors affecting
fire managers' risk-behavior, and barriers to using WFU as identified by fire and fuels
managers (Cleaves et al. 2000, Cortner et al. 1990, Miller and Landres 2004, NWCG
17

1995b). Although the elements found in these studies probably find their way into the
go/no go decision, no research has specifically solicited the administrators' input as to
their relative importance, if any.

Opting to 'go' predicates the viability of WFU as a fuel management tool.
Understanding the drivers of the 'go' decision requires identifying the factors affecting
the people who must assume authority for the consequences. The literature review
indicates a gap in the knowledge that this investigation seeks to fill. Specifically, this
study aims to determine the factors influencing the USPS line officers' go/no decision.
2. METHODS
This study surveyed USPS district rangers with wildland fire use authority on their
districts in USPS Regions 1, 3, and 4. The following section describes the population
studied, the survey instrument used, the interview process, and subsequent data analyses,
in addition to the possible errors associated with data collection.
2.1. Potential Population
The research question addressed in this study immediately narrowed the potential
population to those agency administrators who could authorize wildland fire use in their
areas. Although all federal land management agencies (U.S. Department of Agriculture
Porest Service, U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau of Land Management, National
Park Service, Pish and Wildlife Service, and Bureau of Indian Affairs) have provisions
for wildland fire use, interviewing managers in five agencies would prove prohibitively
expensive. As an agency with a mandate to manage for multiple use, the USPS presented
18

an ideal candidate for examining the decision making behind wildland fire use. To
further restrict the scope of this study, I elected to highlight USPS district rangers with
wildland fire use authority on their districts in USPS Regions 1, 4, and 3. These regions
represent a swath through the Intermountain west.

Although these regions include North Dakota, South Dakota, and Nevada, National
Porest System (NPS) lands in these states do not have provisions for wildland fire use.
The population therefore included district rangers on National Forests in Montana, Idaho,
Wyoming, Utah, Arizona, and New Mexico. While the management of NPS lands falls
along regional boundaries, fire management follows boundaries determined by National
Interagency Coordination Center (NICC) geographic areas. These coordination centers
orchestrate response to wildland fires in areas that roughly correspond to the USPS
regions. The areas included in this study correspond to three Geographic Area
Coordination Centers (GACC): Northern Rockies, Eastern Great Basin, and Southwest.
2.1.1. Identifying the population
This study narrowed its scope short of including all USPS district rangers with wildland
fire use authority due to time and budget constraints. A combination of physical and
confidentiality factors indicated that USPS Regions 1, 3, and 4 would provide a coherent
yet manageable population to investigate.

Lightning constitutes the primary ignition source for wildland fires (Agee 1993).
Although areas in the eastern U.S. typically receive more cloud-to-ground lightning
19

strikes than the West does (NOAA 2004), significant rainfall typically accompanies
eastern lightning storms. In contrast, western thunderstorms often lack moisture
sufficient to extinguish ignitions resulting fi-om lightning activity. Whereas the Eastern
and Southern GACC areas averaged 661 lightning fires per year between 2001 and 2004,
the intermountain west coordination centers^ averaged 1596 ignitions per year, the
Northwestern GACC averaged 1962 lightning fires per year, and the California GACCs'^
averaged 511 per year (NICC 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005). Since, by definition, only
lightning fires have the management option of wildland fire use it seemed logical to
exclude ranger districts in the wetter eastern and southeastern regions, as well as the less
lightning fire-prone California (Region 5).

The occurrence of lightning fires would indicate that district rangers in the Northwestern
and Rocky Mountain GACC areas, corresponding to USPS Regions 2 and 6, also
belonged to the population of interest. However, too few rangers in these regions have
wildland fire use authority on their districts to permit confidentiality in their responses
(nine in Region 2 and seven in Region 6).

The regions that meet the eligibility criteria follow the Rocky Mountain spine south fi-om
Montana. They lie inland, in the dry areas characterized by orographic precipitation
events in the summers and usually reliable snowfall in the winters. Monsoonal flow
tends to bring additional summer rains to Arizona, New Mexico, and southern Utah.
Aside fi-om the lightning trends that set them apart. Regions 1,3, and 4 exhibit a broad

^ Northern Rockies, Eastern and Western Great Basin, Rocky Mountain, and Southwestern
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range of historical fire frequencies, fire regime condition classes, and demographic
distributions that exemplify the land management challenges apparent in other USFS
regions.

Regions 1,3, and 4 encompass all five fire regimes, although predominantly fire regimes
I, II, and III, with few areas in regimes IV, and V (Hardy et al. 2001, Schmidt et al.
2002). Areas of fire regime V fall mostly within the portion of Wyoming included in
Region 4 (Schmidt et al. 2002).

Regions 1,3, and 4 include NFS lands in all three FRCC categories. Areas which have
not missed any fire return intervals (FRCC 1) include some of eastern Montana, most of
Utah and western Wyoming, as well as southern Arizona (Schmidt et al. 2002). Lands in
the northern half of Arizona, most of New Mexico and a smattering through Idaho have
skipped one or more fire return intervals (FRCC 2, Schmidt et al. 2002). Northwest
Montana, the Idaho panhandle, and some areas in north central Arizona have missed
multiple fire return intervals (FRCC 3, Schmidt et al. 2002).

In addition to covering a range of biological characteristics, the three regions in the
population also span a variety of demographic attributes. Although small rural
communities dot the landscape throughout the Intermountain west, several major urban
areas also fall within the study area. Salt Lake and Utah counties in Utah have a
combined population of 1.32 million people. Over 3.89 million people live in Maricopa

* Northern Operations, and Southern Operations
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county, Arizona. Bernalillo and Santa Fe counties, New Mexico, account for 0.72
million residents (U.S. Census Bureau 2005).

Beyond the presence of metropolitan areas within USPS Regions 1, 3, and 4, an
increasing number of residents occupy the wildland-urban interface (WUI). Defined as
the combination of areas with houses next to contiguous vegetation and areas where
houses and vegetation intermingle (Stewart et al. 2005), the WUI grew by an average of
about 30 percent (median of 31 percent) between 1990 and 2000 (Stewart et al. 2005).
2.1.2. Identifying individual respondents
Unpublished data provided by the USPS Rocky Mountain Research Station Aldo
Leopold Wilderness Research Institute (ALWRI) helped identify individual respondents
within USPS Regions 1, 3, and 4. This database included the acreage approved for WPU
in each USPS wilderness area and summarized this information by forest.

I cross-referenced this database with a list of the districts that manage each wilderness
area. Wildemess.net, a website maintained by ALWRI, contained the information
necessary to construct a list of districts with areas approved for WPU. Where data on this
website were incomplete, phone calls to forest offices fleshed out the list of districts.

The original list of district rangers did not include those without wilderness areas but with
WPU as a management option on non-wildemess lands. The Region 3 Director for Puels
and Ecosystem Management suggested three additional district rangers with WPU-
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authority outside of wilderness, and one district ranger in Region 1 also indicated one
additional ranger in a similar position. The USPS employee directory, also available on
the internet, provided names, email addresses, and phone numbers of district rangers.

This identification process led to an initial population of 81 district rangers with WFU
authority both in and out of designated wilderness across Regions 1, 3, and 4. Twentynine rangers work in Region 1, 27 in Region 3, and 25 in Region 4. Given the small
population size, I conducted a census rather than a sample of the identified district
rangers.
2.2. Survey instrument
I developed the survey instrument in December 2004 and January 2005. Questionnaire
construction followed widely accepted guidelines (Groves et al. 2004, Sudman and
Bradbum 1982) and is detailed in this section. This study relied on a telephone
questionnaire because of the associated improvements in response rate and efficiency
over a mailed one (Dillman 1978, Groves et al. 2004). Time and budget constraints
prohibited face-to-face interviews.
2.2.1. Scoping
The literature review detailed previously indicated four surveys that could provide
direction (Cleaves et al. 2000, Cortner et al. 1990, NWCG 1995, Miller and Landres
2004). However, all four relied either on having respondents rank lists of factors or on
reacting to scenarios. Both ranking and scenarios usually provide a prohibitive cognitive
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load to telephone respondents, so this study did not include any previously administered
questions.

The results from these previous surveys did help in identifying the potential influences on
the go/no go decision to investigate in this study. In addition to this earlier research,
scoping conversations with one current district ranger, one deputy forest supervisor
(former district ranger), and one assistant fire management officer (AFMO) further honed
the focus of the information needs. I included the AFMO in this exploratory phase to get
an outside perspective on the factors potentially influencing the go/no go decision.
2.2.2. Pre-tests and content verification
Most questions addressed the district rangers' behaviors with respect to authorizing
WFU, attitudes towards the wildland fire use program, their beliefs about the relative
influence of factors such as external conditions, public perception, budgets, and protocol
(questions 1-18, 23, 24, 29-38, 41-45). Question formulation followed guidelines
outlined by Groves et al. (2004). The questionnaire did include several sensitive
questions probing the district rangers' past experience with fire, their relationship with
their staff, beliefs about potential career impacts following a converted WFU, and
demographic attributes (questions 19-22, 25-28, 39,40, 46-56). Wording for these
questions followed the suggestions outlined by Sudman and Bradbum (1982) as modified
by Groves et al. (2004).
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One forest supervisor, one deputy forest supervisor, and one acting district ranger pre
tested the questionnaire in January of 2005. The pre-testing procedure involved a hybrid
of concurrent think-aloud interviewing (Tourangeau et al. 2000) and probing for
unaddressed influences. This process refined wording and verified that the respondents
understood the questions as intended.
?

After pre-testing, the questionnaire was reviewed by one additional district ranger, one
AFMO, one fire use manager trainee, the Region 1 Director for Watershed, Wildlife,
Fisheries, and Rare Plants, and two fire ecologists at the Aldo Leopold Wilderness
Research Institute. Appendix A contains the final version of the questionnaire, as
administered in this study.
2.3. Implementation

2.3.1. Contacts
I initially contacted regional-level fire staff. The Region 1 Assistant Director for Fire
Management, the Region 3 Director for Fuels and Ecosystem Management, and the
Region 4 Deputy Director for Fire, Aviation, and Air Management offered to write cover
emails introducing my study topic. I followed this introduction with an email to the
district rangers requesting an appointment. Those rangers who still did not respond
received one additional email, which further explained the research project's purpose and
requested an explanation if they preferred not to participate. Eighteen of 81 interviewees
failed to reply after the second email. I resorted to calling these 18 to set up the interview
appointment. In the few cases where this first phone call merely resulted in leaving a
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message, I called a second time and again left a message if I reached voice mail or a
secretary. This four-attempt method resulted in an 88.9 percent contact rate (72 of 81).

Both email and phone contact revealed that 22 district rangers did not have the ability to
use WFU. I did not attempt to collect data from these individuals because the
questionnaire targeted those with the latitude to make the go/no go decision.
2.3.2. Interviews
Initial contact with the district rangers in the study population occurred on February 1,
2005. I conducted the first telephone interview on February 9, 2005. The majority of the
questionnaires were administered by March 4, 2005, with the final interview held on
March 21, 2005. One district ranger did not have signing authority on the Wildland Fire
Implementation Plan Stage 1 documentation; so the go/no go decision on that district
went to the next higher administrative unit, the national forest. An interview with the
forest supervisor in this instance supplanted one with the intended respondent. The
district rangers spent an average of 27.5 minutes (median of 24) answering the survey
questions.
2.5.3. Final case disposition

The American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) defines several
different categories to describe the final case disposition for surveys (AAPOR 2004).

District rangers whom I did not contact after the second message but who did have WFU
on their districts fall into the 'confirmed eligible, message left' category (2.221). I have
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included those rangers whom I was unable to contact or confirm eligible into the
'unknown if housing unit' (3.1) category, since the housing unit comprises the main
eligibility criterion described in the AAPOR standard definitions. In two cases I made
contact with the district ranger but scheduled an appointment that they did not keep. I
assigned these the code 2.35, as eligible, 'non-interview for miscellaneous other reasons'.
Contact with 22 district rangers revealed that they did not have WFU authority on their
districts. These individuals fall into the 'not eligible' category, represented by case code
4.1. Table 1, below, summarizes the final case codes and the code class used to compute
response rate.
Table 1: Final case disposition
Number
Description
Final case code
Interview completed
50
1.1
Eligible, non-contact
3
2.221
Unknown eligibility, non4
3.1
contact
Eligible, non-interview
2
2.35
(appointment not kept, not
rescheduled)
Not eligible
22
4.1

Code class
I
NC
UH
0

The AAPOR defines six methods of obtaining response rate, ranging from
conservative to expansive. These techniques for determining the ratio of complete
interviews to number eligible reporting units vary based on consideration of partial
interviews and cases of unknown eligibility. Using the most conservative computation
yields a minimum response rate (RRl) of 84.75 percent. Twenty-two district rangers
from Region 1,12 from Region 3, and 17 from Region 4 participated.
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2.4. Error associated with this study
Two types of error can mar survey results: non-observation and observational. The
former type of error stems from excluding part of the population of interest in
measurement. Observational errors stem from inaccuracy in the measurement itself
(Groves 1989).

As a census with an 84.75 percent response rate, errors of non-observation cause minimal
concern. Conducting a census eliminates concerns of sampling errors. Although not
eradicated, error associated with coverage and non-response was minimized.

Non-respondents can cast a shadow on result validity if their answers differ significantly
from those of the rest of the population. Of seven non-respondents, four corresponded to
either vacant positions or positions that had been filled since the 2004 fire season. The
remaining three non-respondents face the same terrain, weather, fiiel, and political
contexts as their neighbors who participated. This similarity in geographical and political
situations suggests that their responses would resemble their neighbors' and would
therefore not alter the study's results.

The steps taken in developing the questionnaire sought to mitigate any observational
errors. Such misrepresentations result from the interviewer, the instrument, the
respondent, or the mode of collecting responses (Groves 1989). As the sole interviewer
and principal person concerned with result validity, I minimized the influence of multiple
interviewers, misreading questions, and incorrectly recording answers. The cognitive
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interviewing verified that the respondents understood the questions' language as
intended. This pre-testing procedure also minimized question order effects.

A combination of residual instrument errors and respondent errors may have contributed
the most significant source of error in the data collected. Several of the questions
reflected areas of Agency direction and professional motivations. Despite confidentiality
guarantees, the respondents could have opted to 'toe the Agency line' in their answers
and thus not provide completely candid answers. During the interviews, the district
rangers were encouraged to expand on any of their responses. This led to 47 unprompted
discussions that added detail to the respondent's answers. The district rangers were also
encouraged to request any clarification they needed to mitigate any negative effects of
phone interviewing.
2.5. Analysis
As the main survey to date of line officer attitudes and beliefs towards WFU, statistics
describing the population deserve attention. As a census of the population of district
rangers with WFU authority in USPS Regions 1,3, and 4, their responses do not require
tests of statistical significance. In addition to these summary statistics, I chose to conduct
Classification and Regression Tree (CART) analysis. This study used the Statistical
Package for the Social Sciences (version 10.0) and CART5.0 (Salford Systems) to
conduct the analyses.
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CART analysis presents several advantages over parametric models. The classification
analysis does not rest on assumptions about the distribution of predictor variables' error
terms (Steinberg and Colla 1997). Whereas regression analysis requires the user to
identify interactions between variables prior to analysis, CART can handle interactions
between independent variables. The graphical tree output facilitates model interpretation
and classification of new cases. CART analysis's predictive abilities compare to other
regression models (Breiman et al. 1984, Lewis 2000). Appendix B contains a description
of how CART functions.

Analysis included two CART models. In both, the binary dependent variable identified
whether the district ranger had authorized WFU (1) or not (0). The first model used the
full data set resulting from the questionnaire responses. The second used a reduced group
of factors to classify the district rangers as having authorized WFU on their unit. The
rationale behind the data reduction follows.
2.5 1. Data reduction
The literature review and the questionnaire scoping process led to the creation of eight
variables to use in the CART analysis. These independent variables include confidence
in staff, external factors, experience with fire, agency support, protocol, perceived
program value, staffing level and public perception. Definitions of these variables
follow.
Confidence in staff (STFTRST). This variable captures both the amount of
communication there is on the district about the WFU program, how much trust the
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ranger has in the Fire Management Officer's recommendations and how much they
trust the fire use managers.
-

External factors (EXT). This variable reflects the extent to which other activities,
weather, time of year, location, preparedness level, fire danger indices, presence of
ignitions, and ability to use WFU out of wilderness affects their decision. EXT does
not include resource availability or funding levels.
Past experience with fires (FIRE). This variable indicates the respondent's
experience with fire. It includes total number of type 1 or 2 fires on their unit in the
last three fire seasons as a fraction of the maximum number of T1/T2 fires reported, if
they have had any escaped prescribed fires or WFU fires, their level of fire line
qualifications and whether or not they have had any fire ecology classes. FIRE does
not include acreage of most recent T1/T2 fire since the frequency of complex fire
events is expected to have more influence on the decision-makers.

-

Agency support (AGSPRT). This variable approximates the perceived amount of
support from the agency, potential for career impacts and agency-provided incentives
for WFU. This variable also includes attitudes towards funding levels. Answers to
component variables that reflect a perceived lack of support fi-om the agency are
attributed a negative sign.

-

Staffing (STAFFLVL). This variable captures concerns for resource availability, and
recruitment and retention of qualified people to manage WFU events.

-

Public perception (PUBPERC). This variable reflects the respondent's consideration
for public support for WFU, desire for public education and support, and concern for
impacts to private land.
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-

Protocol/process (PRTCL). This variable indicates the extent to which respondents
believe protocol facilitates the go/no go decision.
Perception of program validity (PROGVAL). This variable reflects the district
rangers' attitudes towards returning fire to the landscape and the use of WFU as both
a fuel management and a wilderness management tool. PROGVAL also includes
their belief in the ability to manage non-suppression fires to meet their objectives, the
cost-effectiveness of WFU as a fuel treatment, and land stewardship incentives to use
WFU.

All variables vary positively, with higher scores indicating higher levels of the variable in
question. Ordinal questions are adjusted to a 0 to 1 scale. Responses to the post-coded
open-ended questions that capture the factor in question are assigned a value of 1. For
example, for the staffing level variable, STAFFLVL, three responses to question 24,
"what do you think you need to make it possible to manage a non-suppression fire to
meet your objectives," reflected the need for adequate staffing. Each instance of these
responses was given a score of 1. A respondent answering that they needed both resource
availability and funding for quality people/resources, for example, would receive a score
of 2. These scores were not re-scaled to fit the 0-1 range reflected in the other component
variables because I determined that volunteered responses carry more weight than ones fit
to a predetermined scale. Collapsed variable values were assigned by summing the
component variable scores. Appendix A contains the questionnaire response code key
and Appendix C contains a detailed key for the collapsed variables' components.
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3. RESULTS
This section presents the results of the interviews of district rangers in USPS Regions 1,
3, and 4. Descriptive statistics will be presented first, followed by the results of the
Classification and Regression Tree (CART) analysis.
3.1. Descriptive Statistics
This section follows the question grouping established in the survey instrument and
presents highlights fi-om these groups. Most questions offered a four-point response
scale:
0: not at all
1: to a small extent
2: to some extent
3; to a very great extent.

As few regional differences surfaced between the respondents' answers, these variations
will be reported only for the applicable questions. Responses to the four open-ended
questions follow the summaries for the main question groups. Appendix D contains the
full results, summarized by USPS region.
3.1.1. Demographics
The population interviewed in this study had been with the USPS for an average of 24
years (median; 25), and had been in their current position for slightly longer than 5.5
years on average (median: 4). Approximately half had line officer experience prior to
their current positions, and 60 percent reported their career goal as district-level
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management. Almost half (48 percent) worked as resource specialists (range specialists,
wildlife or fish biologists, ecologists) and 42 percent moved into line officer duty from
the timber program. Seventy-eight percent of the respondents were male and 72 percent
of the respondents identified themselves as risk-takers.
3.1.2. Eligibility
This set of three questions aimed to identify whether or not the respondent had had the
opportunity to make the go/no go decision in the past three fire seasons (1), if they had
elected to authorize WFU (2) and if they had the authority to use WFU outside of
designated Wilderness (3).
•

80 percent authorized at least one lightning strike to be managed as WFU
(N=46);

•

66 percent have WFU authorization outside of designated Wilderness
currently or in Forest Plan revisions (N=50);
- 82 percent of those with the ability to use WFU outside of
designated Wilderness work in Regions 3 and 4 (N=33).

3.1.3. Program validity
This set of three questions (4-6) intended to determine the respondents' attitudes towards
the goal of returning fire to the landscape and the effectiveness of WFU at accomplishing
that goal.
•

90 percent believe that restoring fire to the landscape is "very important" as a
land management goal (N=50 unless otherwise noted);
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•

60 percent determined that WFU is an effective tool for returning fire to the
landscape to a "very great extent";
- 92 percent of Region 3 respondents identified WFU as effective to
a "very great extent" (N=12);

•

42 percent reported that WFU meets their wilderness management objectives
to a "very great extent".

3.1-4. External factors
Questions 7-15 addressed the influence of external factors not specifically addressed in
the WFIPl process.
•

28 percent reported having high-priority, non-fire projects that affected their
go/no go decision;

•

67 percent indicated that time of year influenced their go/no decision to a
"very great extent" (N=46);

•

46 percent said that an ignition's proximity to the WFU-approved area's
boundary affected their decision to a "very great extent" (N=46).

The three final questions in this series addressed the weight accorded to public support
and public perception.
•

50 percent indicated that concern for public support factored into the go/no go
decision to "some extent" (N=46);

•

48 percent reported that public perception of air quality entered into their
decision to "some extent" (N=46);
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•

48 percent considered public perception of risk from the fire escaping to
"some extent" in their go/no go decision (N=46).

3.1.5. Fire experience
These questions (16-24,47,48) explored the respondents' experiences as line officers
with suppression, prescribed, and fire-use fires.
•

68 percent reported being the line officer for either a Type 1 or Type 2
suppression fire;

•

18 percent had a prescribed fire on their unit escape;
- Prescribed fires escaped due to fire behavior (44 percent) and
weather (33 percent) (N=9);

•

20 percent had authorized a WFU event that was converted to a suppression
fire (N=46);
- 44 percent reported that Maximum Manageable Area restrictions
motivated the conversion to suppression (N=9);

•

54 percent thought that it was possible to manage a non-suppression fire to
meet their objectives to a "very great extent".

The final question in this section asked respondents to identify what they needed to
manage a non-suppression fire to meet their objectives. Resource availability (28
percent), fire danger indices (14 percent), public support (12 percent), and quality people
(12 percent) surfaced most frequently.
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3.1 6. District communication and confidence in staff
Questions 25-28 addressed the amount of pre-season communication about WFU and the
level of confidence in their staff reported by the respondents.
•

26 percent reported that their staff was involved in at least one annual training
event focusing on managing a WFU event;

•

66 percent felt that they shared similar attitudes about an appropriate go/no go
decision with their Fire Management Officer "most of the time";

•

68 percent thought to a "very great extent" that their local WFU managers
would make appropriate tactical decisions for a WFU event in their area;

•

60 percent thought to a "very great extent" that national Fire Use Management
Teams would make appropriate tactical decisions for a WFU event in their
area.

3.1.7. Forest Service policy and protocol
The first five questions in this series (29-33) examined funding for WFU and fuels
management performance targets.
•

43 percent indicated that using the 'G' code to pay for WFU does nothing to
help them meet their district's fuels target (N=40);

•

40 percent thought to a "very great extent" that WFU was a cost-effective way
to achieve fuels targets.

The remaining questions (34-45) probed the extent to which current decision protocol
facilitates the go/no go decision and explored the incentives and disincentives to
authorizing WFU.
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•

48 percent indicated that, to "some extent," their Fire Management Plans
contained useable information for the go/no go decision;

•

SOpercent reported that the Wildland Fire Implementation Plan Stage 1
process aided the go/no go decision to "some extent";

•

50 percent felt that they had access to the resources they needed to manage a
fire as WFU to "some extent";

•

48 percent revealed that, in their opinion, authorizing a WFU that damaged
other values at risk would have a negative impact on their job;

•

90 percent said they had incentives to use WFU;

•

64 percent reported that they had disincentives to use WFU.

Open-ended questions asked respondents to identify any incentives (42), or disincentives
(44) to authorize WFU and to rate the top three factors affecting their decision (45). The
number of responses follows each response in parentheses. As respondents could provide
more than one answer, the total number of responses exceeds the number of respondents.
These open-ended questions were post-coded. The total number of answer categories
resulting from the post-coding process follows the response summary for each question.
•

Ecology/land stewardship (41) was reported most often as the incentive to
authorize WFU (15 answer categories);

•

Risk of the unknown (8), career impacts (7), and public perception (7)
surfaced most frequently as disincentives to WFU (22 answer categories);
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•

Fire danger indices (21), resource availability (20), location (17), and time of
year (16) were identified as the top factors influencing the go/no go decision
(26 answer categories).

3.2. Classification and Regression Tree Analysis
Classification and regression tree analysis (CART) offered the most appropriate analysis
tool for this data set. The go/no go decision amounts to a detailed risk assessment that
weighs potential costs against potential resource benefits. The Decision Criteria
Checklist, described previously, specifies five tiers to this process:
-

threat to life, property, or public and firefighter safety;
effects on natural and cultural resources;
relative risk indicators;

-

other proximate fire activity;

-

other agency administrator issues.

If, at any of these levels, cost exceeds benefit then the decision tips to 'no go' and the risk
assessment stops. Other factors entering into the go/no go decision that this study
explored could follow a similar tiered pattern. CART provides a sort of 'road map' to
navigate such a hierarchical decision process. The classification marks each intersection
and determines whether a case progresses towards 'go' or if the risk assessment halts.
Appendix B contains a detailed description of the CART technique.
3.2.1. Classifying influences on the go/no go decision
Two separate CART analyses were run on the survey data collected during this study.
The two model runs used a binary target variable, WFU. The binary variable resulted
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from collapsing the number of lightning strikes in the WFU-approved area managed as
WFU in the last three seasons. A score of 0 was attributed to answers of 'none' or 'few.'
'About half,' 'most' or 'all' were attributed a score of 1. Model runs used Salford
Systems CART 5.0 software (Steinberg and Colla 1997) and kept the default settings of
the Gini splitting criterion, 10-fold cross-validation, minimum parent node N=10, and
minimum child node N=1. The best tree was selected based on minimum probability of
misclassification estimated through cross-validation.

The first model included all the interval, ordinal, and binary variables used in the survey
instrument (Model 1). The second model relied on the aggregated variables developed as
described in the Methods section. Model 2 included the eight aggregated variables program value, external factors, fire experience, agency support, protocol, staffing level,
and public perception.

The summary of these models' classification and performance follows. Cross-validation
(test) prediction success provides the most accurate estimate of model performance
(Steinberg and Colla 1997), and is reported for both models.
Model 1
Model 1, run using the raw data set from the interviews, identified one primary splitter.
The response to question 5, "to what extent is WFU an effective tool for returning fire to
the landscape", allowed the cleanest partition between those respondents who authorized
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WFU and those who did not. Table 2, below, summarizes Model 1 performance, and
Figure 1 illustrates the model.
Table 2: Model 1 test prediction success

Actual Class Total Cases
Test
data

0
1

Percent Correct

24
22

70.8
90.9

Predictec Class
0
1
N=19
N=27
17
7
20
2

Figure 1: CART Model 1

Node 1
Class = YES_WFU
PR0G2 = (3)
Oass Cases %
N0_WFU 24 52.2
YES_WRJ 22 47.8
N = 46

II

CO

Terminal
Node 2
Oass = NO WFU
Oass Cases %
NO WFU 17 89.5
YES WFU
2 10.5
z

II

z

Terminal
Node 1
Oass = YES WFU
aass Cases %
NO WFU
7 25.9
YES WFU 20 74.1

In this model, all respondents who answered "to a very great extent" (coded 3) to PR0G2
(question 5) fall into the left branch (terminal node 1). This split isolates 20 of 22
respondents (91%) who authorized WFU. Respondents who do not meet the splitting
rule fall into the right branch (terminal node 2), which isolates 17 of 24 respondents who
did not authorize WFU.
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This tree offers insight into the influences on the go/no go decision. Looking at surrogate
splitters provides additional information on factors affecting the decision without
sacrificing accuracy. These surrogate splitters are selected based on their ability to mimic
the patterns in the primary splitting variable (PR0G2). Respondents who follow the
splitting rule for the surrogate splitter have similar characteristics to those who follow the
splitting rule for the primary splitter. Table 3, below, summarizes the surrogate splitters
for node 1.

Respondents identifying themselves as either risk-takers (coded 3) or as risk-neutral
(coded 1) in DEMI (question 46), and respondents with fewer than 22.5 years with the
USPS (question 50, DEM5) behave similarly to respondents who believe that WFU is
effective at returning fire to the landscape to a "very great extent." These respondents
would fall into the left branch illustrated in Figure 1 and are likely to authorize WFU.
Table 3: Model 1 surrogate splitters, node 1

1
2

Surrogate
DEMI
DEM5

Split
1,3
22.5
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Association
0.265
0.232

Improvement
0.042
0.061

Model 2

Model 2 used eight collapsed variables to classify the dependent variable. This
classification resulted in a tree with five decision nodes and six terminal nodes. Program
value, public perception, staff trust, external factors, and agency support successfully
identified 63.6% of respondents who authorized wildland fire use. Table 4, below,
summarizes Model 2 performance.

Table 4: Model 2 test prediction success

Actual Class Total Cases
Test
data

0
1

28
22

Percent Correct
67.9
63.6

Predicted Class
0
1
N=19
N=27
19
9
8
14

Figure 2, on the following page, depicts Model 2. This model presents a more complex
map to navigate than Model 1. Each intersection, or node, provides a make-or-break rule
for whether or not the respondent will continue down the tree.
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Figure 2: CART Model 2
Model
Class =YES_WRJ
PROGVAL<= 3.8
Class Cases %
NO_WFU 28 56.0
YES.WFU 22 44.0
N=50
Teminsd
Node t
Class = NO WFU
Class Cases %
NO WFU 10 90,9
YES WFU 1
9.1
N = 11

Node 2
Class = YES WFU
PUBFG%<= -0.2
Class Cases %
NO WFU 18 46.2
YES WFU 21 53.8
N = 39
Node 3
Class = YES WFU
STFTRST<= 2.4

Terminal
Node6
Class =N0 WFU

Class Cases %
NO WFU 14 40.0
YG WFU 21 60.0
N = 35

Class Cases %
NO WFU
4 100.0
YES WFU 0
0.0
N=4
Node 4
Class:YES WFU
EXT<= 6.5

Terminal
Node 2
Class = N0 WFU
Class Cases %
NO WFU
5 83.3
YES WFU 1 16.7
N=6

Class Cases %
NO WFU
9 31.0
YES WFU 20 69.0
N = 29
Nodes
Class = YES_WFU
AGSPRTc 2.5
Class
:ases %
NO_WFU
7 25.9
YES_WFU 20 74.1
N 27
Terminal
Node 3
Class =YES_WFU
Class Cases %
NO_WFU
5 20.0
YES_WFU 20 80.0
N = 25

Terninal
Nodes
Class = NOJ/VFU
Class Cases %
NO_WFU
2 100.0
YES WFU 0
0.0
N=2

Terminal
Node 4
Class = NO_WFU
Class Cases %
NO_WFU
2 100.0
YES_WFU 0
0.0
N=2

The first intersection, at program value (PROGVAL <= 3.8), diverts 11 respondents and
classifies them as not authorizing WFU (terminal node 1). This indicates that program
value is the most important factor, and progression to the next decision rules hinges on
the score for this variable.
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Respondents who make it through the intersection at program value move to the next one,
at public perception (PUBPERC <=-0.2). Here, though counter-intuitive, respondents
who perceived a level of public support above -0.2 are classified as not authorizing WFU
(terminal node 6). Survey participants who reported a level of public support below this
threshold value continue to the next intersection, which occurs at staff trust.

This more intuitive split indicates that staff trust plays the next most important role in
determining whether or not respondents have authorized WFU. Respondents who
reported a level of confidence in their staff below 2.4 are classified as not authorizing
WFU (terminal node 2) and do not continue down the tree.

The next criterion involves external factors. Respondents who scored at the iq)per end of
external considerations (EXT>6.5) do not authorize WFU (terminal node 5). Those who
meet the splitting rule of EXT <= 6.5 move on to the final intersection, at agency support.

This final tier separates those respondents who perceive that the Agency facilitates the
decision to use WFU. Again counter-intuitively, respondents who scored above the
threshold value of 2.5 did not authorize WFU (terminal node 4). Conversely, respondents
who met the decision rule AGSPRT<=2.5 did authorize WFU (terminal node 3). Ninetyone percent (20 of 22) of respondents who authorized WFU follow the tree all the way
through to this final intersection.
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4. DISCUSSION
Interpretation of CART-analysis results indicates that the go/no go decision rests on
personal commitment to returning fire to the landscape. This overarching theme helps
explain the sometimes counter-intuitive modeling results. The decision structure
presented by Model 2 highlights potential deterrents to WFU, and responses to individual
survey questions suggest specific barriers to WFU. These potential barriers lead to
recommendations for facilitating the incorporation of WFU into the fuel management
toolbox.
4.1. "You are acting outside the scope of your employment if you do not do what
is best for the land"
Both CART models indicate that the value placed on the WFU program provides the
most important determinant of whether a respondent authorized wildland fire use.

In Model 1, the extent to which the respondent thinks the WFU program is effective at
returning fire to the landscape provides the sole split. The surrogate splitters indicate that
those who find WFU effective to a "very great extent" are either risk-takers or riskneutral, and have been with the USFS for fewer than 22.5 years. This model suggests
that for those line officers who emphasize returning fire to the landscape, the benefits of
letting a natural process occur outweigh the effects of other factors. The emphasis on the
value of the program helps explain why respondents who have not been with the USFS as
long are more likely to authorize WFU. As one respondent suggested, a "dominant
suppression paradigm" still permeates the USFS. Changes in fire policy show a shift
fi-om suppression to fire management at the national level. However, land managers
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perhaps steeped in earlier organizational values have some reservations about WFU as an
effective tool, even if the broader goal of returning fire to the landscape resonates with
them.

The tree presented in Model 2 mirrors the findings of Model 1 and fleshes out the
hierarchy in the decision process. From Model 2 emerges a group of decision-makers
that stands behind returning fire to the landscape, and is strongly motivated by 'doing the
right thing' for the land. Beyond this belief, these district rangers have confidence in
their staff but do not feel supported by either the public or their employer. As one
respondent said, "the nexus of temporal, spatial, and political factors doesn't always
align" and yet individuals driven by their desire to do right by the land will proceed with
WFU.

Combining the results of Models 1 and 2 suggests that a cohort of district rangers is
motivated by "the laudable, noble goal of ecosystem restoration" and is convinced that
WFU will accomplish this goal. According to the CART models, this cohort will
predictably see potential benefits to the resource outweighing potential risks, and decide
to 'go.' The models suggest the idealistic nature of those who reliably authorize WFU,
but also highlight the obstacles that prevent district rangers from authorizing WFU across
the board.
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4.2. ^'There is more value to the resources at risk than value to allowing fire back
on the landscape"
Responses to the open-ended questions in this study draw attention to the risks that make
implementing a stewardship ethic a costly gamble. External factors, public perception,
resource availability, and agency support all surfaced as top considerations that inhibited
the 'go' decision.
4.2.1. External factors: "WFU is risky business"
Environmental factors came up as the main consideration influencing the go/no go
decision, and a key to managing non-suppression fires to meet objectives. Specifically,
fire danger indices were mentioned seven times in the context of managing a nonsuppression fire and 21 times as the top consideration in the go/no go decision. Location
and time of year surfaced 17 and 16 times, respectively, as the most important factors
influencing the go/no go decision. Beyond these repeated concerns, weather, ignitions,
smoke, and threatened and endangered species habitat all came up as considerations that
weighed in the go/no go decision. These factors reflect concern for "risk of the
unknown" that 8 respondents mentioned as a disincentive to use WFU.

Deciding to authorize a WFU event can engage a district's management capacity for an
extended period. The time commitment involved depends on unpredictable events such
as weather and lightning ignitions. In the midst of this uncertainty, air quality and
endangered species regulations, and private property considerations impose definite
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restrictions on management activity. Even for those supportive of fire restoration, the
daunting requirements to ensure in this uncertain environment often prove prohibitive.
4.2.2. Public perception: "Dick Cheney is not too hip on smoke"
Public support and public perception surfaced six times as a requirement for managing
non-suppression fires to meet objectives and seven times as a disincentive to using WFU.
Respondents evoked concerns for the political fallout of the external considerations
described previously Smoke, perceived or real threats to threatened and endangered
species habitat, and resource damage perceived as unacceptable by the public, all came
up as specific areas of public concern. These concerns stem to some extent from a
partially misinformed public that still views all wildland fires as a threat.
4.2.S. Resource availability: "We need trained people with the right qualifications"
Resource availability surfaced 20 times as the top factor entering into the go/no go
decision, 14 times as what was needed to manage a non-suppression fire to meet
objectives, and in 18 unprompted discussions that arose during the interviews.
Respondents mentioned that the level of qualifications required for fire use managers
constrained WFU authorization. In addition, several respondents indicated that they
lacked skilled personnel in sufficient numbers to manage WFU.

Respondents also indicated that candidate lightning ignitions frequently occurred when
other fire activity was high. In these situations, the line officers did not have the staff on
hand to manage the ignitions as WFU. Potential staff shortages cause concern given the
indeterminate duration of WFU events.
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Respondents mentioned the need for aerial resources in addition to personnel. Two
respondents specifically indicated that the availability of helicopters had allowed them to
manage WFU events to meet their objectives. In both cases, water bucket drops by the
helicopters cooled down flanks that would have otherwise hit management action-points
and triggered a shift to suppression.
4.2.4. Agency support: "Signing 'go' is a lonely feeling"
The need for agency support surfaced as a requirement for managing non-suppression
fires to meet objectives. Respondents also cited a perceived lack of agency support as a
disincentive to authorizing WFU. This perceived lack of agency support takes two
forms. First, respondents expressed a doubt that the agency would stand behind their
decision if a WFU event went awry. Second, respondents indicated that the current focus
on meeting hazardous fuel reduction targets impeded their use of WFU.

Potential career impacts surfaced seven times as a disincentive, and 14 times in
unprompted discussions. Three respondents mentioned specific concerns about the
potential for criminal charges as a result of recent after-action reviews of suppression
fires that led to fatalities. Weighing resource benefits against potential damage to the
decision-maker's family makes 'no go' more attractive.

Pressure to meet targets and lack of credit for WFU came up as disincentives to using
WFU and surfaced in 14 unprompted discussions. These respondents indicated that they
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could not credit acres restored through WFU towards fuels targets. At the same time,
they suggested that prescribed bum targets conflicted with using WFU. Further, two
respondents reported that they would suppress lightning fires within areas prepared for
prescribed bums because the WFU fire would not count towards the prescribed fire
targets.
4.3. Recommendations for facilitating 'go'
The CART models suggest that the line officers authorizing WFU do so because of their
personal belief in the program, despite the risks involved. Responses to the open-ended
questions indicate the inhibiting factors. If national policy dictates restoring natural
processes as well as reducing fuel loads, then it is not sound to depend only on those
altmistically driven to this goal to make the 'go' decision.

Expanding the use of wildland fire for resource benefits requires an effort to mitigate the
inhibiting factors: external factors, public perception, resource availabiUty, and agency
support. The obstacles to using WFU need removal to encourage the 'go' decision. I
propose eight recommendations to address these barriers. The first four
recommendations involve steps that districts or forests could take to facilitate authorizing
WFU. The next four suggestions require agency-wide effort.
4.3.1. District- or forest-level actions
1. Review implementation guidelines.
The implementation guidelines identify the conditions under which a 'go' decision is
acceptable. These guidelines intend to facilitate the risk assessment included in the 'go/
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no go' decision. If the prescriptions set in these guidelines set too stringent of conditions
or do not assist the decision process, then the guidelines should be modified. In addition,
Forest Plans currently under revision could expand the acreage eligible for WFU.

2. Preload information needs for WFIP 1.
External considerations such as weather, smoke production, and resources at risk provide
challenges, if not limitations, to the use of WFU. With the compressed decision time
frame, any steps taken ahead of time to identify and mitigate these concerns will reduce
the perceived risk of the unknown. As one respondent noted, "WFU is a planning
exercise." Pre-loading information on potential resources at risk, fuels, potential safety
hazards, and natural fire breaks into a Geographic Information System, for example,
would expedite the qualitative risk-assessment in the WFIP Stage 1.

3. Preplan WFIP Stage 3.
Similarly, the Stage 3 Wildland Fire Implementation Plan requires a detailed, quantitative
risk assessment and cost estimates. These components constitute a considerable planning
effort that could be conducted in the off-season. Once developed, periodic updates would
ensure that the Stage 3 plans remained current. When the need arose, the predetermined
quantitative risk assessment could guide the assessment for WFIP Stage 1. In addition,
slight modifications would adapt the prepared Stage 3 plan to a specific WFU situation
that progressed to that level.
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4. Manage WFU through WFIPl with local suppression resources.
Changes to the Wildland Fire Use Implementation Procedures Reference Guide in
February 2005 modified the staffing requirements for WFU. With this iteration of the
implementation guide, a Type 4 Incident Commander may manage a WFU through the
Stage 1 level. These resources are more common at both the forest and district level than
fully qualified Fire Use Managers. This new staffing requirement should ease some of
the concerns for resource availability.
4.3.2. Agency-wide actions
1.

Promote WFU to dispatch centers and geographic area coordination centers
(GACC).

The availability of sufficient qualified personnel and the ability to use aerial resources
can determine successful management of a WFU event. In some cases, having these
resources available for even a few shifts maintained the fire in WFU status. Dispatch
centers, part of forest-level fire staff, provide the link between fire-use managers and the
resources they request, and the GACC establish resource priorities. Depending on other
fire activity, successfully acquiring the needed resources depends on pursuing the
resources more doggedly than necessary for a suppression fire. Promoting wildland fire
use applications to the dispatch and GACC components of the fire organization may help
WFU managers obtain the resources they need.

2.

Clarify after-action reviews.
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Concerns for career impacts seemed to stem largely from actions taken after recent
reviews of suppression fires that led to fatalities and escaped prescribed fires. The survey
results show that few district rangers visit the Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center
website, the main vehicle for sharing information on fire reviews. The Agency grapevine
could have disseminated mis-information about the conditions under which the reviews
occurred. In addition, one respondent indicated that After Action Review (AAR) teams
were not consistent in their findings, and different teams arrived at different conclusions
on similar cases. This inconsistency, in addition to a lack of accurate information, may
lead to concerns over career impacts. Homogenizing the approach to AARs and ensuring
accurate information sharing would alleviate career concerns.

3.

Clarify goal of fuel reduction targets.

The USPS has stated two fire/fuel-related goals: 1) restoring fire as a natural process, and
2) reducing hazardous fuel loads. Results of this study indicate that district rangers feel
pressure to achieve fuel reduction targets. Concurrently, line officers do not get credit for
assuming the risks associated with WFU: acreage burned under WFU does not count
towards accountable target accomplishment. This leads to suppressing candidate WFU
fires inside prepared prescribed bum areas. In addition, this lack of credit poses a
challenge to meeting hazardous fuel reduction targets during seasons that offer WFU
opportunities but provide limited prescribed burning windows because of fuel conditions.
If WFU, a tool that accomplishes both agency goals, is to increase, then the perverse
disincentive to authorizing WFU requires rectification.
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4.

"Teach by doing"

Respondents in areas with a history of prescribed natural fire and wildland fire use
indicated that their local public neutrally (if not favorably) on WFU. Drawing attention
to successfully managed WFU events and their consequent benefits to local ecosystems
may provide the most effective means to curry public support.
5. CONCLUSION
The position of line officer in the US Forest Service draws people with a strong
commitment to working for the good of the land. As with many public sector careers,
there are few benefits other than satisfying a personal land stewardship ethic - a
characteristic that holds true in the context of using lightning ignitions to restore fire to
the landscape. This study suggests that authorization of WFU by district rangers
primarily stems from their personal commitment to restoring fire for the good of the land,
despite multiple disincentives. If national policy mandates restoring fire as a natural
process, then implementation should not rely uniquely on those willing to take risks for
their personal ethic. Recommendations presented in this paper suggest ways to mitigate
obstacles to 'go,' the keystone of using WFU as part of a full suite of fire and fuel
management options.
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APPENDIX A: QUESTIONNAIRE
Italicized headings identify question grouping.
Eligibility
1.
In the last 3 fire seasons, since 2002, have you had any lightning starts in the
WFU-approved area?
Yes
No
IF RESPONDENT ANSWERS 'NO' ONLY ASK QUESTIONS UNDERLINED.
2.

Thinking about the last 3 fire seasons, since 2002, about how many lightning
starts in the WFU-approved area have you managed as WFU?
All
Most
About half
Few
None

3.

Do vou have WFU authorized outside of the wilderness?
In LRMP/FMP revision
Yes
No

4.

5.

Program value
Where do vou place returning fire to the landscape as a land management goal?
Very important
Somewhat important
Neither important nor unimportant
Somewhat unimportant
Very unimportant
Mechanical treatments, prescribed burning and WFU can all help reintegrate fire
into the landscape. To what extent, if at all, do vou think that WFU is an effective
tool for returning fire to the landscape?
Very great extent
Some extent
Small extent
Not at all
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6.
To what extent, if at all, does the WFU program meet your wilderness
management objectives?
Very great extent
Some extent
Small extent
Not at all

1.

Environmental factors
In the last three fire seasons, since 2002, were there any high-priority, non-fire
projects in your area that caused you to consider suppressing an eligible WFU
fire?
PROMPT; For example, grizzly bear DNA testing in Region 1.
Yes
No

IF Y, THEN 8, ELSE 9.
8.

To what extent, if at all, did these projects influence your go/no go decision?
Very great extent
Some extent
Small extent
Not at all

9.

To what extent, if at all, does time of year influence your go/no go decision?
Very great extent
Some extent
Small extent
Not at all

10.

Do the areas approved for WFU on your district share boundaries with other
administrative units or landowners?
Yes
No
IF Y, THEN 11, ELSE 12.

11

Do you have appropriate agreements in place with adjacent units or landowners in
case a WFU would cross boundaries?
Yes
No
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12. To what extent, if at all, does proximity to WFU-approved area boundaries affect
your go/no go decision?
Very great extent
Some extent
Small extent
Not at all
13. To what extent, if at all, does concern for public support affect your go/no go
decision?
Very great extent
Some extent
Small extent
Not at all
14. To what extent, if at all, does concern for public perception of air quality influence
your go/no go decision?
Very great extent
Some extent
Small extent
Not at all
15. To what extent, if at all, does concern for public perception of risk from the fire
escaping influence your go/no go decision?
Very great extent
Some extent
Small extent
Not at all

16.

Fire experience
Were you the line officer for any Type 1 or 2 suppression fires?
Yes
No

17.

About how big did the most recent Type 1 or 2 fire get?
ACRES

18.

If there have been more than one Type 1 or 2 fire on your unit since 2002. how
many haye you had?
NUMBER OF FIRES
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19.

The last few fire seasons have had some of the most active fire behavior in recent
history. In the last 3 fire seasons, since 2002. have vou had anv escaped
prescribed fires on your unit?
Yes
No

20.

In the last 3 fire seasons, since 2002, can you think of an instance where you
authorized a fire to be managed as WFU and the fire was later converted to a
suppression fire?
Yes
No

21.

Often weather, fuel conditions, resource availability, public and firefighter safety,
or money available to return the fire to prescription will change a prescribed fire
to a suppression fire. Can you give me an idea of what made the fire go fi-om
prescribed to suppression?
ANSWER

22.

Again, often weather, fuel conditions, resource availability, maximum
manageable area size, public and firefighter safety, or cost will cause management
to change a WFU event to a suppression one. Do you happen to recall what
determined the shift from WFU to suppression?
ANSWER

23.

To what extent, if at all, do you think it's possible to manage a non-suppression
fire, whether prescribed or fire use, to meet your objectives?
Very great extent
Some extent
Small extent
Not at all

24.

What do you think is needed to make it possible to manage a non-suppression
fire, either prescribed or fire use, to meet your objectives?
ANSWER

25.

District communication
How, if at all, do non-fire program areas contribute to the WFU program before
fire season?
ANSWER
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26.

How often, if ever, do vou feel that you and your FMO share similar attitudes
about what constitutes an appropriate go/no go decision?
Always
Most of the time
About half the time
Occasionally
Never

27.

Managing a WFU event can involve monitoring, taking some suppression actions,
calling in national management teams, or converting the fire to a suppression
event. To what extent, if at all, do vou think your local WFU managers will make
appropriate tactical decisions for a WFU event in your area?
Very great extent
Some extent
Small extent
Not at all

28.

Managing a WFU event can involve monitoring, taking some suppression actions,
or converting the fire to a suppression event. To what extent, if at all, do vou
think national Fire Use management teams will make appropriate tactical
decisions for a WFU event in your area?
Very great extent
Some extent
Small extent
Not at all

29-

30.

Forest Service policy and protocol
How often, if ever, do you use ftiels budget money (WFHF) to pay for WFU?
Always
Most of the time
About half the time
Occasionally
Never
To what extent, if at all, does using the G code for WFU help meet your district's
fiiels targets?
Very great extent
Some extent
Small extent
Not at all
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31.

To what extent, if at all, do you think that WFU is a cost-effective way of
achieving fuels targets?
Very great extent
Some extent
Small extent
Not at all

32.

To what extent, if at all, does using WFU to achieve targets influence your
decision to go/no go?
Very great extent
Some extent
Small extent
Not at all

33.

Suppose BAER funds were available to help rehab infrastructure damaged during
a WFU event. To what extent, if at all, would having these funds available
influence your go/no go decision?
Very great extent
Some extent
Small extent
Not at all

34.

To what extent, if at all, do you think that your FMP contains useable information
for the go/no go decision?
Very great extent
Some extent
Small extent
Not at all

35.

To what extent, if at all, do vou think that the Wildland Fire Implementation Plan
Stage 1 process aids the go/no go decision?
Very great extent
Some extent
Small extent
Not at all

36.

How often, if ever, do you visit the Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center
website?
Very often
Often
Not often
Never
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37.

To what extent, if at all, do you feel that information provided on this website
assists your go/no go decision?
Very great extent
Some extent
Small extent
Not at all

38.

To what extent, if at all, do vou feel that you have access to the resources vou
need to manage a fire as WFU?
Very great extent
Some extent
Small extent
Not at all

39.

Suppose vou decide to 'go' on a WFU event that later damages other values at
risk. In vour opinion, will this have any negative impact on vour job?
Yes
No

40.

The way fires progress can have repercussions on decision-makers' careers. This
has come to a lot of folks' attention after the Cerro Grande fire in Bandelier
National Monument in 2000, and more recently with the Cramer fire on the
Salmon-Challis in 2003. To what extent, if at all, does concern over negative
impacts on your career influence your go/no go decision?
Very great extent
Some extent
Small extent
Not at all

41.

Do you have any incentives use WFU?
Yes
No

42.

IF Y. What are they?
ANSWER

43.

Do vou have any disincentives to use WFU?
Yes
No

44.

IF Y. What are they?
ANSWER
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45.

46.

Thinking about the decision making behind the go-no go decision on WFU as a
whole, what are the top 3 factors affecting your decision on every project?
ANSWER
Demographics
Would you characterize yourself as more of a risk-taker or a risk-avoider?
Risk-taker
Risk-avoider
Risk-neutral

47.

What fire qualifications do you have?
ANSWER

48.

Have you had any formal fire ecology classes?
Yes
No

49.

IF Y.
College
Agency
Both

50.

When did you start with the USFS?
YEAR

51.

When did you start in your current position?
YEAR

52.

Prior to this position, were you a line officer?
Yes
1
No
0

53.

IF Y. How long?
ANSWER

54.

What are your career goals?
District-level management
Forest-level management
Region-level management
National-level management
Other
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55.

What is your professional backgroxmd?
Recreation
Timber
Engineering
Fire
Resource Specialist
Other

56.

What is the highest level of education you have?
High-school
Vocational school
Some college
Associates
Bachelors
Some grad school
Masters
Doctorate
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APPENDIX B: HOW CART WORKS
Classification and regression tree analysis (CART) uses repeated binary partitioning to
provide an accurate classifier for a data set or to uncover a predictive structure (Breiman
et al. 1984). CART analysis programs contain algorithms that search all possible binary
split levels in all the independent variables. CART analysis then selects the split that
isolates the largest pure class of the dependent variable (Gini splitting criterion, Lewis
2000). This process constructs a tree with branches occurring at decision nodes. These
nodes split into "children," with all cases in the data set that meet the node's splitting rule
going to the left child and the remaining cases going to the right child. Sphtting
continues until pure nodes result (terminal nodes). This is the maximal tree (Breiman et
al. 1984).

This maximal tree tends to overfit the data used to construct the tree, with the analysis
modeling both true patterns and noise in the data. To increase the tree's applicability to
different cases, the maximal tree can be pruned based on a complexity parameter. This
metric indicates how much additional accuracy a split must add to the entire tree to
warrant the added complexity (Lewis 2000). The pruning process yields the optimal tree
that attempts to balance accuracy for the data on hand with accuracy on future data.

Ideally, a 'learning' data set is used to grow the tree and a separate 'test' data set
determines the tree's accuracy. While large data sets (n>3000) allow isolating learning
and test portions, smaller data sets do not have this option. In order to test the
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performance of a tree constructed using a small data set, CART relies on cross-validation
(Steinberg and Colla 1997).

Cross-validation estimates the classification accuracy of the full tree based on its ability
to classify independent test sets. The data are partitioned into V independent groups that
include the entire data set. In the first iteration, the first group is reserved as a test set and
the remaining V-\ groups build a tree. The accuracy of this tree is then assessed based on
how well it classifies the district rangers reserved in the first partition. This process
repeats V times. These separate models' average performance estimates the overall
model's accuracy. The cross-validation process also determines the complexity
parameter level so that the end model does not overfit the data (Lewis 2000). The tree
construction and cross-validation processes result in a model that isolates the independent
variables responsible for classifying the dependent variable with the least impurity in the
classification. New cases can then be dropped down the tree. At each node, the new case
is evaluated against the splitting rule, and then moved on to the next node until the case
reaches a terminal node and can be classified.

When classifying new cases, CART identifies 'surrogate' splitters to move a case with
missing values down the tree. These surrogate splitters are independent variables whose
distributions follow a similar pattern to that of the primary splitter. The surrogate split is
defined as the one that most accurately predicts the action of the primary splitter on a
case by case basis (Breiman et al. 1984, Steinberg and Colla 1995).
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APPENDIX C: COLLAPSED VARIABLE KEY
Column 2 contains the question number. Columns 3 through 6 contain the post-coded
answers that were included in the new variables. A negative sign indicates that the
response's score was subtracted in the new variable's construction.

3
Question 24

1
Variable
name
STFTRST
EXT

2
Questions rescaled to 0-1
25, 26, 27, 28
8,9,12

FIRE

16, 18, 19, 20,
47,48
5(-),6(-)
34, 35
30,37, 39 (-), 15(-)
40 (-),41,
43 Cj

PRTCL
AGSPRT

STAFFLVL
PUBPERC
PROGVAL

4
5
Question 42 Question 44

11, 12, 16,
17, 19

38
3,13,14
13 (-), 14(-)
2
15(-)
4,5,6, 23,31.

1,2,12,13,
14,15,22

14
6, 10, 12,
13, 16

I,2, 4,5,
II, 17
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6
Question 45

ll(-)
5(-),6(-),
10 (-), 16 (-),
18(-),19(-),
23 (-)
7
3(-),4(-),
20(-)

16
22(-),27(-),
24

6
4(-),5(-),
12(-)

APPENDIX D: SURVEY RESULTS BY REGION
Eligibility
1

Question
Opportunity to use WFU

2

Number 1)1'ImhiniMi! %iiike\ iiKui.i^ed

Response

V

3

Ability to use WFU outside of
wilderness

Yes
No
ÀM
M#ik,
Half

•

In plan revision
Yes
No

Total
46
4
5
7
-,
^ W
i
Hr

R1
19
2

R3
11
1
h -3' : '

R4
16
1

4
29
16

0
6
15

1
10
0

3
13
1

R1

R3

R4
c -'a

11
1
0
0

7
10
0
0

iz : ..

i

Attitude towards WFU program
4

Question
linportaiiLi.- o( iclurnmg liic lothe
LiiulsL.ipc

Response
Total
\ cry important
45
Somewhat
S if.
important
Somewhat
unimportant

5

Extent to which WFU is an effective
tool for returning fire to the landscape

6

I Mcnt IM which WII ' meets
wilderness inaniiuenient objectives

Very great extent
Some extent
Small extent
Not at all
Very great extent
Some exJsnt :
Small exicpt
Not at all
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30
20
0
0
21
18
6
2

E'W
12
9
0
0
;
I
-

0

Mc

r« >

0

External factors
7
8

Question
High-priority, non-fire projects
Extent to which these affect go/no
go decision

9

Extent to which time of year
influences go/no go decision

10

Boundaries with other units or
landowners
Appropriate agreements in place

11
12

f'.Mcnl to which proximité to WTl

•ipproved dreii hound.ir^ .ilTccti
gii iH> go dL-c-ision
14

Extent to which public perception of
air quality affects go/no go decision

15

i'.Mcnl to whicli public peiccplion of
iisk from the lire escaping .iHuiis

go no go decision

Response
Yes
No
Vcrv urcHt extent
Some extent
Small extent
Nut ai all
Very great extent
Some extent
Small extent
Not at all

Yes
g...

M

-No
Yes
No
Very great extent
Some extent
Small extent
Not at all
Very great extent
Some extent
Small extent
Not at all
Very great extent
Some extent
Small extent
Not at all
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Total
14
33
7
2
2 ;
0
31
12
2
1
48
2
^
39
8

R3
3
8

R1
5
15
2 "V
1
1
0
10
8
1
0

:*

^-

.4'10
0
0
1
'J2c
0
10
1

18
3

21
24 : •

W,.

-

. 1
0
12
22
9
3
11
22
11
2

6%

K 0
5
3
1
2

2
11
6
0

- ;Î2 #
'

0

R4
6
10
3
0
1
0
11
4
1
0
15
2
11
4
4
11
1
0
5
8
2
1
5
2
7
2

Fire experience
16

Question
Line officer for Type 1 or 2 fires

17

Acroagc of largest Type 1 or 2 fire

18

Total number of Type 1 or 2 since
2002
I'sLMpcd prescribed fiic on iiniL
since 2002
-J
20
WFU converted to suppression on
unit since 2002
21 ; Reason for cscapcd proscribed fire
(culunins do noi .uld up lo total
reported for tfl9 because of
multiple reasons for escape)
22

Reason for converted WFU
(columns do not add up to total
reported for #5 because of
multiple reasons for conversion)

23

Extent to which think it's possible
to manage non-suppression fire to
meet (»hjecti\os

24

What is needed to make it
possible to manage a nonsuppression fire to meet
objectives

Response

Total
34
Yes
No
16
16421
Mean
Median
8000
Mean
2.3
Median
2
- i^!'Ycs
9
No
41
9
Yes
No
31
Fire behavior ..
Weather
Resource
,
availability
Other
2
Merged with
1
suppression fire
Weather
2
Resource
3
availability
4
MMA
Cost
2
Other
2
Very great extent k' 27 c. '
Some extent
22\:
Small extent
NtAMa#
Resource
14
availability
Acceptable fire
7
danger indices
7
Quality people
Public support
6
Authority
5
Time of year
2
Location
1
Pre-treatments
1
Agency support
1
Weather
1
Other
6
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R1
R3
R4
20
7
7
10
1
5
31063
11575 10125
11000
5500
2.4
0.5
2.5
2.5
0
2.5
3
18
9
Ï14 •
4
3
2
13
9
9
0
a
\ 0
a
:
0
1 :

;t

s
1

0

0

0
3

0
0

2
0

2
1
1
12

1
0
1
6

1
1
0

g

3

3

3

1

3

1
3
3
1
1
1
0
0
0

2
1
2
1
0
0
0
0
2

4
2
0
0
0
0
1
1
4

'

District communication and trust
25

2(»

Question
Non-fire program area
contribution to WFU pre-fire
season

Sh.iicJ iiiiiludc W i l l i 1 VIO iiboiil
.ippinpii.ilc gii no uo iloL-i-<ion

27

Belief that local WFU managers
will make appropriate decisions

28

Mciioriliai ii.itiDiutI I'[iMlsu>iIl
mukc jppriipiiiitc décisions

Response
More than one armual
training or planning
activity
One annual training or
planning activity
One-time input to
training or plarming
Favorable attitude
No pre-season
contribution
Always
Most of the time
About half the time
Occasionally
Never
Very great extent
Some extent
Small extent
Not at all
Verv great extent
SiMllC C X i C I l t
Small extent
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Total
4

R1
1

R3
3

R4
0

9

5

1

3

13

5

3

5

6
15

2
6

1
4

3
5

14
33
1
0
0
34
14
1
0
30

'41V
1

% : K#. WiO #
13
7
1
0
lA

0
11
5
0
0
11

10
2
0
0
:

-

'1' "

1
0 \

Budget considerations
29

30

Question
Frequency that fuels budget
money is used to pay for WFU

I Mcni to whiiti f ! OKII.- h>.lps
11 ICI 1 disirict>> I'ucl^ targets

31

Extent to which WFU is a costeffective way of achieving fuels
targets

32

1 \icm lo w hit h
WI l = lo
:ichic\ J liimcih inducnccs jjo ro
ilccisioii

33

Extent to which having BAER
funds available would influence
go/no go decision

Response
Total
Always
1
Most of the time
3
About half the time
0
Occasionally
1
Never
26
Don't know
7
\ cr\ L'tcai extent
5
Some extent . at?"
Small extent
Not at all
Dont knpw
.
Very great extent
20
Some extent
20
Small extent
8
Not at all
2
Very great extent
%
Some extent
3
14
Small extent
Very great extent
Some extent
Small extent
Not at all
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5
8
13
24

R3
0
1
0
0
7
3

R1
0
1
0
0
10
4

R4
1
1
0
1
9
0
0

;
. 2 1^
10
11
0
0
.

6
n
2
4
5
10

7
3
1
1
'A.':
4
5
1
3
2
6

V 1
3
6
7
1

2
1
6
8

'

Protocol and process
^4

35

lA

Question
Fxtent to which FMP contains
useable information for go/no
go decision
Extent to which WFIPl
process aids go/no go decision

T rciiiioncv of v isits lo
Wildliind l ire Lesson".
I eunied fViiicr websiie

37

3K

39

40

Extent to which information
provided on this website
assists go/no go decision
I \lcnl to whiih h.i\c ^cccs^ to
rc^oijiccs needed to m.in.ige
fire as WFU
Negative impact on job if
authorize a WFU that damages
values at risk
I \Ient to whieh concern for
negative impacts on caritt-^l
influences go no go decision

41

Incentives to use WFU

42

Incentives

43

Disincentives to use WFU

Response
Very great extent
Some extent
Small extent
Not
at all
!
Very great extent
Some extent
Small extent
Not at all
Vcr>' often
Often
Not often
Never
Very great extent
Some extent
Small extent
Not at all
Very great extent
Some extent
Small extent

Total
22
24

R1
II

21
25

10

20
24

II

11

21
24

11

Yes
No

24
24

11

Very great extent
Some extent
Small extent

20

13

M.

_2^

45

21

41

19

32
18

14

Yes
No
Ecological/stewardship
Wilduniess management
Fuel reduction
Cost
Safety
Agcncy policy
Agency credit
G code
In plan
Historical use
Regional priority
Teach by dc
Yes
No
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R3

44

Question
Disincentives

Response
RimK ol unkiuiwn
Public perception
('•iicct impacts
External conditions
Potential impacts to
private landPolitical climate
Smoke
Kcsiuircc Jil<iliilit>
No cre^
Resource impacts
Proximity to WUI
^iipiiri-SNiDii p.K.uligm
Pressure to meet
pri'sv.ribcd bum targets
Pliinniii" process
Other

45

Top three factors influencing
go/no go decision on every
project

Fire danger indices
Resource availability
Location
Time of year
Impacts to resource
Safety
Impacts to private land
Political climate
Impacts to recreators
Fuel type
Potential to exceed
MMA
Preparedness level
Smoke
Public perception
In plan
Impacts to improvements
Previous treatments/fires
Gut
Experience
Resource objectives
Proximity to T&E
species
Cost
Weather
Ignition type
Documentation
Other activity (fire and
other)
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Total
8

R1

R4

% ^

;

7

R3

-A.

'

-

%
:

.-

1

:
0

#00#
1

^

iky#. !^ . 0 - - ,
4^"^J

-

A ^

.1

21
20
16
16
13
11
8
4
3
3
3

10
7
10
7
3
4
5
1
1
1
2

4
7
1
4
5
3
2
1
0
1
0

\c 7
6
5
5
5
4
I
2
2
I
1

3
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
I

1
2
I
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1

0
0
0
0
0

1
0
0
0
0

0
I
1
1
I

Demographics
46

47

48

Question
Risk .IVOKICI IIR risk-tdkcr

Fire-line qualifications

I »n)i.il lue ccolo^v cl.ISSUH

49

Fire ecology class location

50

I mic WrUh I "SI'S

51

Time in current position

52

I'l Kir line el Ikci i'\peiiciicc

53

Length of prior line officer
experience
Career goals

Response
Kisk neutral
Risk avoidcr
Division supervisor +
Crew boss to division
supervisor
On IMT, no fire-line
qualifications
Agency administrator
to firefighter 1
None
Yes
No
College and agency
College/university
Agency
Mean
Malum
Mean
Median
Yes
^

54

55

56

Professional background

r ilucdiioii Itivul

Sex

Total
6

1?

'B. ; '

11
7

4
1

4
2

11...
3
4

12

5

2

5

16

9

4

3

4

2

0

2

11

K

1

36
14

18
13
5
24.3

2S
5.6
4
23

9
7
1
22.3
• 21 ''
5.2
4
19

NO

Mean
Median
District-level
management
Forest-level
iiKinagement
Region-level
mjn.iycment
N.iiioniil-level
nnnj^'cmciit
CHher
Recreation
Timber
Engineering
Fire
Resource specialist
Other
BachcIors degree
Some graduate school
Mastmâe^:
Female
Male
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R4

3

R3
4
0

R1

3

3.9
2.5

30

14

5.2

M ,i 9
4
5
3
3
4
0
15.8 ^ 263-: '
15.5
IF;
4.25
5.6
2.5
4
7
6
& f)'
11
1.5
5.1
1.3
3.5
6

10

( -5' - X

;

\

;

0
2;

1

gk
3
17

0

. J
7;

8

2
4
1
0
9
9

33

14

0
6
0
0
6
0
7

9
8
11
39

4 '

I

4

5
1

1
16

1

0
21

1
7
0
0
6
3
12

%
5
16

